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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOEL SCOTT McNEARNEY, : Case No. 20090463-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
SUMMARY 
The trial court committed prejudicial error when it denied Mr. McNearney the 
right to argue the State had failed to prove an element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment, the trial court denied Mr. 
McNearney the right to argue to the jury that the vacant uninhabited structure he entered 
was not a "dwelling" as that element is defined under Utah law and therefore was guilty 
of the lesser offense of burglary of a building, a third degree felony. When the issue went 
to the jury, the question of whether Mr. McNearney entered a "dwelling" was a question 
of fact, as are all elements of an offense, for the jury's determination. Where there was 
evidence presented to support Mr. McNearney's theory of the case, he was entitled not 
only to argue the State failed to establish the element of the offense but to have the jury 
instructed on the lesser included offense of burglary of a building. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN DENYING MCNEARNEY THE 
RIGHT TO ARGUE THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH AN 
ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE AND HAVE THE JURY INSTRUCTED 
ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE WAS PREJUDICIAL. 
Mr. McNearney was entitled to argue to the jury that the State had failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt the necessary element that the offense was "committed in a 
dwelling" because the structure at issue—a newly built vacant house that had never been 
occupied—did not fit within the statutory definition of "dwelling." It is well settled that 
every fact necessary to prove an element of an offense must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt to the finder of fact. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (2008); United 
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1995) ("The Constitution gives a criminal 
defendant the right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, his guilt of 
every element of the crime with which he is charged."); State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 589-
90, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (1931) ("It is the sole and exclusive province of the jury to determine 
the facts in all criminal cases, whether the evidence offered by the state is weak or strong, 
is in conflict or is not controverted."). An element of an offense "is defined as a "fact 
necessary to constitute the crime." State v. Palmer, 2009 UT 55, ^[11, 220 P.3d 1198 
(quotations and citation omitted); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(2). When the trial 
court denied Mr. McNearney the opportunity to argue the vacant house in this case was 
not a "dwelling" as defined under Utah law and therefore Mr. McNearney was only 
guilty of the lesser offense of burglary of a building, it relieved the State of its burden to 
prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; State v. Davis, 2007 
UT App 13, 155 P.3d 909 (trial court committed prejudicial error by improperly 
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instructing the jury that a bicycle path was a public park constituting a drug free zone, an 
element of the offense, was established as a matter of law). The trial court's 
determination was prejudicial. 
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments together "'give[] a criminal defendant the right 
to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime with which he is 
charged.'" Palmer, 2009 UT 55 at Tfl 1 (citation omitted); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
275, 277 (1993) ("The prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the 
offense charged and must persuade the factfinder 'beyond a reasonable doubt' of the facts 
necessary to establish each of those elements."(citations omitted)). The most important 
element of the Sixth Amendment is "the right to have the jury, rather than the judge, 
reach the requisite finding of 'guilty.'" Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277. Also encompassed 
within these amendments guaranteeing a defendant's right to a jury trial is the 
requirement that a defendant's lesser included offense instruction must be given where 
there is evidence to support the theory. See State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 
1988) (The requirement to give a lesser included offense instruction "when there is some 
evidence which supports the theory asserted by defendant... is more than a procedural 
nicety"). 
Although the State argues that "the trial court decided a pure question of law," 
when it denied Mr. McNearney the opportunity to argue his theory of the case to the jury 
and failed to give the lesser included instruction requested, the State cannot escape that 
the question of whether or not Mr. McNearney entered a "dwelling" remained an element 
of the offense that required a jury determination of guilt. See Appellee Br. 19; Gaudin, 
3 
515 U.S. at 511-14. As defense counsel argued below, the issue was a question of law 
for the court to consider when determining the motion for directed verdict. R. 124:151. 
However, when the trial court denied the motion and presented the issue to the jury it was 
a question of fact for the jury's determination. R. 124:151. The United States Supreme 
Court explained in Gaudin, that "the jury's constitutional responsibility is not merely to 
determine the facts, but to apply the law to those facts and draw the ultimate conclusion 
of guilt or innocence." Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 514. The Court noted that prior decisions 
that "the judge must be permitted to instruct the jury on the law and to insist that the jury 
follow his instruction" did not "undermine[] the historical and constitutionally guaranteed 
right of criminal defendants to demand that the jury decide guilt or innocence on every 
issue, which includes application of the law to the facts." Id at 513-14. 
Mr. McNearney was entitled to have the jury instructed on the lesser included 
offense of burglary of a building where there was evidence to support his theory of the 
case that a vacant house that has never been occupied was not a "dwelling" as that 
element is defined within the statute. See State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 871 (Utah 
1998); Standiford, 769 P.2d at 266 ("A defendant is entitled to have his legal theory of 
the case placed before the jury if it would not be superfluous to do so because of an 
absence of any evidence to support the theory."). Because neither the statute nor prior 
case law has specifically defined a "dwelling" under the burglary statute as encompassing 
a newly built vacant house that has never been inhabited, the trial court could not as a 
matter of law determine that Mr. McNearney was prohibited from arguing his theory. 
When the issue went to the jury, the question of whether Mr. McNearney entered a 
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"dwelling" was a question of fact, as are all elements of an offense, for the jury's 
determination. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522-23. 
It cannot be said that the trial court's error in denying Mr. McNearney the 
opportunity to present his defense and its failure to give the lesser included instruction of 
burglary of a building was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in that no reasonable 
juror would have found that the structure was not a "dwelling" and convicted Mr. 
McNearney, instead, of third degree burglary. State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ^|45, 55 
P.3d 573 ("Where the error results in the deprivation of a constitutional right, we apply a 
higher standard of scrutiny, reversing the conviction unless we find the error harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt."). The trial court denied Mr. McNearney the right to argue 
his theory of the case, that the structure he entered, did not meet the definition of a 
"dwelling" as that term is defined by statute. R. 124:150-53. Yet, the State was allowed 
to argue to the jury that the element of whether the structure Mr. McNearney entered was 
a "dwelling" was met stating "We have a house. The purpose of the house is for people 
to stay overnight. This wasn't an office building. This wasn't a warehouse. This wasn't 
a garage. We have a dwelling." R. 124:171. By failing to allowing Mr. McNearney to 
fully present his defense, the trial court allowed the question of whether a "dwelling" was 
entered to go to the jury uncontested essentially removing a disputed issue of fact from 
the jury's consideration and relieving the State of its burden to prove all the elements of 
the offense. State v. Penn, 2004 UT App 212, ^28, 94 P.3d 308 ("An error is prejudicial if 
it tends to 'mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or 
erroneously advise[s] the jury on the law.'"). 
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In this case, by denying Mr. McNearney his right to argue to the jury the State 
failed to prove an element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore at most 
he was guilty of burglary of a building, a third degree felony, the trial court invaded the 
province of the jury as the factfinder and violated Mr. McNearney's Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights to have the jury determine his guilt or innocence. The trial court's 
denial of Mr. McNearney's constitutional right under the Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and requires reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above and more fully set out in Appellant's opening brief, 
Mr. McNearney respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction for burglary of 
a dwelling, a second degree felony and enter a conviction for burglary of a building, a 
third degree felony. In the alternative, Appellant requests a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this J ^ _ day of August, 2010. 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
TAWNI HANSEEN 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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